Malicious code committed to the Amazon Q Developer VS Code extension via a compromised token (AWS, 2025)
Malicious code was committed to the extension's open-source repository using a compromised GitHub token in a build configuration.
What happened
- AWS said the payload did not execute because of a syntax error, so no environments were changed.Security Update for Amazon Q Developer Extension for Visual Studio Code (Version 1.84)
- AWS revoked the credentials, removed the code, withdrew version 1.84.0 and released version 1.85.0.Security Update for Amazon Q Developer Extension for Visual Studio Code (Version 1.84)
The failure pattern
Watch the pattern: Weak or phishable authentication on a privileged path
Safeguards that address it
CollectSEA's engineering analysis of what would have prevented or contained this failure.
- Protect build credentials and require review for releasesKeep repository tokens out of build configuration and require reviewed, protected branches for release code.
- Verify release contents before publishingDiff release artifacts against reviewed source and scan for unexpected instructions or scripts.
Related standards
CollectSEA's mapping through this incident's failure pattern; not an official determination by the standards bodies.
- ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse
- ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
- LLM03 Excessive Agency
- LLM04 Supply Chain
- AC-3 Access Enforcement
- AC-5 Separation of Duties
- AC-6 Least Privilege
- IA-2 Identification and Authentication
- RV.3.4 Update the development process
- MAP 5.1 Estimate impacts from past uses and public incident reports
- Goal 1 Multi-factor authentication
- Goal 2 Default passwords
- CWE-862 Missing Authorization
- CWE-308 Use of Single-factor Authentication
Building something similar?
Describe your design and see every precedent that applies, with safeguards you can hand to your coding agent.
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