Documented incidentIncident 2021-06-08FastlyEngineering postmortem

Valid customer configuration change triggers a latent software bug across a CDN (Fastly, 2021)

A software deployment on May 12, 2021 introduced a bug that a specific valid customer configuration could trigger; on June 8 a customer pushed such a change.

What happened

  • The bug caused about 85% of Fastly's network to return errors; the issue was detected within a minute and 95% of the network was back to normal within 49 minutes.Summary of June 8 outage

The failure pattern

Watch the pattern: Global change without a staged rollout

Safeguards that address it

CollectSEA's engineering analysis of what would have prevented or contained this failure.

  • Canary software changes and watch for latent bugsRoll out to a small share of the network first and verify behaviour under real customer configurations.
  • Enable fast detection and rollbackDetect errors within a minute and keep a one-step way to disable the triggering configuration.

Related standards

CollectSEA's mapping through this incident's failure pattern; not an official determination by the standards bodies.

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