Documented incidentIncident 2025-10-19Amazon Web ServicesEngineering postmortem

Latent race condition in DNS automation leaves DynamoDB's regional endpoint with an empty record (AWS, 2025)

A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS management system produced an empty DNS record for the regional endpoint that the automation could not repair, so clients could not resolve the endpoint.

What happened

  • The disruption on October 19-20, 2025 spread to dependent services including EC2, Network Load Balancer, Lambda, container services, Security Token Service and IAM authentication.Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB Service Disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region
  • AWS disabled the DNS automation worldwide until the race condition is fixed, added velocity controls to NLB health checks and improved EC2 recovery testing.Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB Service Disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region

The failure pattern

Watch the pattern: Automation acts on stale state or authorization

Safeguards that address it

CollectSEA's engineering analysis of what would have prevented or contained this failure.

  • Make control-plane automation safe against stale plansVersion and verify plans so an older plan cannot overwrite a newer one, and give operators a safe manual path to repair an empty record.
  • Limit how fast health failures remove capacityAdd velocity controls to dependent health checks so one dependency fault cannot cascade through the region.

Related standards

CollectSEA's mapping through this incident's failure pattern; not an official determination by the standards bodies.

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