Documented incidentIncident 2016-10-13UberRegulatory or court record

AWS access key in a private GitHub repository leads to 57 million rider and driver records taken (Uber, 2016)

Between October 13 and November 15, 2016, intruders used an AWS access key that had been posted to a private GitHub repository to access Uber's Amazon S3 datastore.

What happened

  • Engineers accessed the repositories through individual accounts without required multi-factor authentication, and the intruders got in using passwords exposed in other breaches.FTC analysis of revised proposed consent order: Uber Technologies
  • They downloaded about 25.6 million names and email addresses, 22.1 million names and mobile phone numbers, and 607,000 names and driver's license numbers; Uber did not disclose the breach until November 2017.FTC analysis of revised proposed consent order: Uber Technologies

The failure pattern

Watch the pattern: Weak or phishable authentication on a privileged path

Safeguards that address it

CollectSEA's engineering analysis of what would have prevented or contained this failure.

  • Keep secrets out of repositoriesScan for access keys before commit and push, use short-lived role credentials instead of long-lived keys.
  • Enforce MFA and unique credentials for code hostingRequire company-managed, MFA-protected accounts so passwords from other breaches cannot be reused.

Related standards

CollectSEA's mapping through this incident's failure pattern; not an official determination by the standards bodies.

Building something similar?

Describe your design and see every precedent that applies, with safeguards you can hand to your coding agent.

Analyze your design